Iraq: Tribes vs. al-Qaeda
Belatedly following the advice of Capt. Travis Patriquin, the army is apparently trying hard to work with Sunni sheikhs, many of whom have become disillusioned with al Qaeda. Patriquin was killed while this strategy was just getting off the ground (pay link), but it seems to be having some success–for example, Ken Pollack and Michael O’Hanlon claim that al-Anbar province is now one of the safest areas in Iraq. A Lexis Nexis search shows only 4 references to the Sunni Triangle in US newspapers in June and July of this year, down from 19 in the same period last year.
This makes a lot of sense for tribal leaders. They have always jealously guarded their power, against the Ottoman Empire, against the British, and even against Saddam. In 2003, the biggest threat became the US-backed provisional government, which as Patriquin’s slide show pointed out, sought to dismantle tribal leadership and centralize power with Shi’a government in Baghdad. So most of the Sunni sheikhs were willing to cooperate first with their old rivals the Ba’athists, and then with al Qaeda.
But in 2007 it seems pretty ridiculous to suggest that the Shi’a government in Baghdad is actually going to exert centralized control over Anbar. The problem for the sheikhs now is that the (often foreign) terrorists they invited in aren’t willing to leave, and are trying to become an independent power player in the Sunni Triangle, with their own ideological agenda. In much of Iraq, sectarian power struggles drive the violence, and provide an incentive to paper over intra-sectarian differences. But there are no Shi’a in al Anbar, and the Baghdad government is a paper tiger, so the sheikhs are free to turn against al Qaeda. When the US Army comes around at the same time offering money and support to do what you want to do anyway, why not cooperate?
In Baghdad’s confused tangle of sects, people are putting aside jihad against the Crusaders in order to kill each other for more mundane political advantages. In Anbar, the sheikhs line up with the US to hunt down terrorists. But in both cases, al Qaeda is being beaten only because it gets in the way of Iraqi interests hammering out their own future.
Optimistically, I hope the situation in al Anbar offers some small hope for a balance of power between the government and various factions in Iraq, perhaps leading to a sort of de facto federalism. On the other hand, an Iraq which is even partially stabilized by co-opting the tribal power structure won’t be an Iraq with real democracy, individual rights, freedom of religion, women’s rights, or even a government that doesn’t brutalize its own people.
on September 2nd, 2007 at 11:25 pm
[…] from a Washington Times article) has some great comments on the Sunni tribes’ revolt (which I discussed earlier). It supports my general view that the tribal leaders’ falling out with al-Qaeda is a result […]